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Summary. In this article, I view the TV industry as a two-sided market, with 
advertisers on one side benefiting from the presence of TV viewers and on the other 
side TV viewers having a dislike for advertising on TV. I use this framework to discuss 
the likely future development of pay TV, in particular how a future increase in 
competition in the TV industry will affect the prevalence of pay TV over advertising-
financed TV. 
 
1. Introduction 
TV stations share a crucial feature with most other media firms – they serve two distinct 
groups of clients: on the one hand content consumers (i.e., TV viewers) who demand 
information and/or entertainment, and on the other hand advertisers who want the attention of 
potential customers. The two groups affect each other’s well being, in that TV viewers dislike 
advertising, whereas advertisers like viewers’ attention.2 
                                                            
1This article is based on a presentation at the conference “The cultural economy’s new frontiers”, Paris, 3 
October 2008. I am indebted to Hans Jarle Kind and Lars Sørgard for collaboration on several media-economics 
projects in recent years and for helpful comments on an early draft, and to Åshild Auglænd Johnsen for research 
assistance. Financial support from the Research Council of Norway’s VERDIKT program through SNF – the 
Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration is greatefully acknowledged. 
 
2Several pieces of evidence exist corroborating the premise that TV viewers dislike advertising. Wilbur (2008), 
for example, econometrically estimates a structural model of TV-market competition and finds that viewers’ loss 
from advertising is significant, while Danaher (1995) documents how TV viewers try to avoid advertising 
breaks. Also on the Internet, advertising seems to be annoying to many content consumers; see, for example, 
results from a user survey carried out in Norway recently and reported by Bakken (2008). In other media, the 
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This means that, in the TV industry, we have a case of two-way externalities. In economics, 
markets with such a feature are called two-sided markets.3 A prominent example outside 
media is the credit-card industry, with merchants and card users being the two groups in 
question. Sometimes, the firms in a two-sided market are called platforms, to catch the role 
they play between the two user groups. Thus, the phrase platform competition is another name 
for what goes on in a two-sided market. 
A difference between the TV industry and many other two-sided markets is that the 
externalities in this particular industry go in opposite directions. While the two groups in the 
credit card industry both benefit from the presence of the other group (merchants’ benefits 
from joining a credit card company increase with the number of card users involved, and card 
users’ benefits increase with the number of merchants available), viewers would prefer fewer 
rather than more advertisers in TV. 
Another special feature in many TV markets in Europe is that there are a fairly limited 
number of TV firms operating; or, at least, the big majority of viewers are concentrated on a 
rather limited number of TV channels.4 Thus, we have a combination of imperfect 
competition and two-way externalities. The question to ask is then: how does a market with 
those two features work? 
 
2. Digitalization and pay TV 
It is not possible to cover all aspects of this question in a short article. I will therefore focus on 
providing some comments on the role of pay TV in this industry. Pay TV means that TV 
firms give viewers access to their program content only if payment is received. This, of 
course, brings up questions on how to exclude non-payers from receiving TV signals. Until 
recently, the pay-TV segment was basically limited to cable TV, with cables bringing 
2 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
picture is more mixed. In particular, many magazines are consumed in part for their advertising; see, for 
example, Depken and Wilson (2004). 
3For overviews of the literature on two-sided markets, see, for example, Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Evans and 
Schmalensee (2007). 
4 According to the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (2005), the four major TV channels’ share of all 
viewers in European countries are quite high, ranging from 55% in Germany through 67% in the UK and 70% in 
Italy to 80% in France. (Numbers are from 2003 or 2004). 
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restricted TV signals out to paying households. However, recent technological advances have 
opened up for new ways of running pay TV. First, it is now possible to obtain payment from 
consumers without stretching cables, through satellites and digital terrestrial TV.5 Secondly, 
the TV industry can – and some TV firms already do – interact with the internet industry to 
obtain ways of getting viewer payment.6 
Below, I will be exploring some consequences of this development. On the one hand, we may 
expect to see TV firms introducing pay TV operations where before there was only 
advertising-financed TV. What can we expect from the increased prevalence of pay TV in 
terms of program content? On the other hand, digital terrestrial TV in particular means that a 
greater number of TV channels are brought out to viewers through over-the-air transmission. 
This implies potentially an increase in competition in the TV industry, and so the question is 
what effects we can expect from this increased competition when it comes to the role of pay 
TV. 
 
3. Pay TV and program content 
Consider first the effect of pay TV on program content. How competition affects the 
characteristics of products offered in the marketplace has been an issue in economics since the 
work of Hotelling (1929). The starting point for the discussion is that consumers – in our case, 
TV viewers – differ in terms of their preferences for these product characteristics. To be 
specific, think about possible TV programs as being somewhere between sports and movies, 
as in Figure 1, with “sports” indicating a program schedule containing sport events only and 
“movies” indicating one with movies only. Of course, this is an abstraction from reality, since 
TV programs vary in many dimensions.7 But as with many models in economics, it is a useful 
3 
                                                            
5 See Galperin (2004) and García Leiva, et al. (2006) for discussions of the digital-TV transition in a number of 
countries. 
6 One example is the Norwegian TV channel TV2, which offers premium content based on consumer payments 
through its Internet service TV2 Sumo, where one can subscribe either weekly, monthly, or annually,  or simply 
pay for watching one particular program;  see http://webtv.tv2.no/webtv/.  
 
7 One way that TV programs can vary, which is somewhat characteristic for this industry, is by scheduling. See 
Nilssen and Sørgard (1998) for a discussion of competition between TV channels through the scheduling of their 
news programs. Another important aspect is program quality. As argued by Motta and Polo (1997), TV channels 
competing in quality may lead to a state of natural oligopoly, in which an increase in demand does not  increase 
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abstraction. Viewers come in many shapes, and we can think of them as distributed along the 
line in Figure 1 according to what their ideal program mixes are: Viewers to the very left 
prefer a sports-only TV channel, viewers to the very right prefer a movies-only TV channel, 
while viewers in-between prefer some mix of sports and movies. 
 
TV1 TV2
4 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
sports movies 
FIGURE 1: Competition in program content 
Suppose we have before us a duopoly, as indicated in the figure, with the two TV firms 
located on the line according to the program mixes they carry: The further to the left in the 
figure a TV firm is located, the more sports, and the less movies, there is in the firm’s 
program mix. If the TV firms are both exclusively financed by advertising, then the single 
concern for each of them is to maximize the number of viewers: Advertisers do not care about 
program content, only about how many viewers a TV channel has, and the more viewers, the 
more advertisers are willing to pay for an ad on that channel. The implication is that a TV 
channel financed solely by advertising revenues profits from stealing viewers from its rival 
channel. 
In Figure 1, the more sports oriented TV channel TV1 would increase its viewer clientele by 
increasing the share of movies in its program mix, this way getting more similar to TV2 and 
gaining some of the viewers with preferences currently in-between the two channels without 
losing any sports addicts at the far left. A similar reasoning leads TV2 to choose a program 
mix close to that of TV1. The upshot is that the two advertising-financed TV channels end up 
with almost identical program mixes, as depicted in Figure 2. This outcome might be fine for 
viewers with balanced preferences. However, niche viewers with interests not shared by 
everybody are not well served. On balance, the verdict in terms of social welfare is that 
program mixes are too similar.8 
the number of TV channels. Both scheduling competition and quality competition are left out of the present 
discussion. 
8 The earliest statement of this argument – that TV channels solely focused on maximizing the number of 
viewers tend to have too similar content – dates back to Steiner (1952). His analysis was subsequently extended, 
notably by Beebe (1977). See Owen and Wildman (1992) for a detailed and accessible presentation of the 
analyses by Steiner and Beebe. 
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5 
                                                           
 
 
FIGURE 2: Advertising-financed TV 
Consider, alternatively, a case of pay TV, where TV firms are financed not only by 
advertising but also by payments from viewers. Now, viewers care about both the program 
mix and the price of a TV channel. A TV firm faces a trade-off when determining its program 
mix. As above, getting more similar to the rival TV firm steals viewers from the other 
channel, which in isolation is still a good thing. But now there is a new effect: the more 
different one TV channel’s program mix is from that of the other channel, the more emphasis 
a viewer places on the TV channels’ contents, and correspondingly less emphasis will be 
placed on the channels’ viewer prices, when choosing which TV channel to watch. This 
means that a TV channel that stands out as different from its rival will be able to charge 
higher prices from its viewers. The trade-off for a TV firm in the pay-TV case is thus that 
having a content similar to the competition means that the number of viewers is at its highest, 
which is good for the TV firm’s chances on the advertising market, but it also means that the 
viewer price is at its lowest. In the simple model of Figure 1, the outcome easily becomes the 
opposite of that of the case of advertising-financed TV, with TV channels now providing pure 
niche programming, as illustrated in Figure 3. This means that TV channels now provide a too 
differentiated program mix, with too much adherence to the needs of viewers with special 
interests and too little to that of viewers with balanced interests.9 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Pay TV 
 
9 With consumers uniformly distributed along the line in Figure 1, the social optimum would have each of the 
two TV channels halfway between the midpoint and one of the extreme positions. I.e., if the possible program 
mixes belong to the line segment [0, 1], with pure sports at 0 and pure movies at 1, the social optimum locates 
the two channels at ¼ and ¾. 
movies
TV1 TV2
sports 
TV1 TV2 
moviessports 
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More generally, however, one might think that pay-TV firms choose some kind of middle 
ground, with program mixes that differ from each other, without being total niche providers. 
If that is the case, then the implication is that pay TV provides us with a more balanced mix of 
program content than does advertising-financed TV. 
 
4. Pay TV and increased competition 
As discussed above, the introduction of digital terrestrial TV (DTTV) makes room for an 
increase in the number of firms, since DTTV allows more TV channels than before to access 
viewers who only receive over-the-air transmission. In order to analyze the effects of this 
increased competition on the performance of the TV industry, we need a different take from 
that which we presented above. Unfortunately, the above analysis is not very suitable for 
discussing effects of an increase in the number of firms. Also, it may be argued that with 
many TV channels present, the plurality of program content is no longer a major issue. Let us 
therefore address the TV industry from another angle: Suppose viewers’ main concern, when 
it comes to program content, is variation.10 Moreover, let us distinguish between two effects 
6 
                                                            
10 Modelling TV viewers’ preferences in terms of variation dates back to Spence and Owen (1977). Their 
approach was extended, taking into account viewers’ disutility from advertising, by Wildman and Owen (1985). 
However, both these contributions picture the TV industry as one of monopolistic competition, which essentially 
implies assuming an infinite number of firms in the industry. This makes it impossible to discuss implications of 
an increase in the number of firms. What is needed is, first, a model of a TV oligopoly, and secondly, a 
specification of viewer preferences that allows us to distinguish between the pure effect of an increase in the 
number of firms and the effect of increased similarity between them. 
Such an analysis is found in Kind, et al. (2007), where viewers’ preferences are modeled through a 
representative viewer endowed with a utility from watching TV given by a version of the so-called Shubik-
Levitan utility function, originally formulated by Shubik and Levitan (1980): 
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where U is the representative viewer’s utility, Vi is the quantity of TV watching consumed by the representative 
viewer at TV channel i, m is the number of TV channels, and s is a measure of similarity of program content, 
with s = 1 implying that program contents are identical, whereas s = 0 is the opposite extreme with program 
content being so different that demand for content from various TV channels is independent. 
The analysis in Kind, et al. (2007) is based on the presumption that TV firms are totally advertising 
financed and does therefore not allow for a discussion of pay TV, which is the focus of our present concern. The 
necessary extension is, however, presented in Kind, et al. (2008), on which the present discussion is based. 
A related discussion of viewer vs advertising revenues for the TV industry is found in Godes, et al. 
(2008). But their set-up does not allow the same disentangling of the effects of an increase competition as does 
that of Kind, et al. (2008). 
 
SNF Working Paper No 39/08 
of more TV channels coming into the industry. First we have the mere effect of an increase in 
the number of firms competing in the market. But there is another effect: more TV channels 
also mean an increase in similarity between TV channels’ content, as long as new channels, at 
least in part, aim for mainstream viewers. Interestingly, the effect of increased similarity does 
not work in the same way as the effect of an increase in the number of firms. 
Suppose now that TV firms can receive revenues both from viewers’ payments and from 
advertising. The question is how an increase in competition affects their relative interest in the 
two sources of revenue. This can tell us something about whether, with increased competition 
in the TV industry, we can expect pay TV to be on the rise – or the opposite, with advertising 
being the main source of revenue. 
Increased competition can come about in two ways: by an increase in the number of firms in 
an industry, and by the firms’ products becoming more similar and therefore closer substitutes 
in terms of consumers’ preferences. By isolating the two effects in a discussion of the effects 
of increased competition in the TV industry, we will be able to see how the two effects work 
in different directions. When a new TV station enters a market, both effects are most likely 
present: there is an increase in the number of firms, and TV stations become more similar by 
this new TV station’s entry. Disentangling the two effects will facilitate a better 
understanding of the forces behind the final outcome. 
As stressed above, the TV industry is a two-sided market with firms addressing both viewers 
and advertisers. But the two markets behave differently, essentially because viewers dislike 
the presence of advertisers while advertisers still want to have viewers around. First, take a 
look at the market for viewers. TV firms’ prices to viewers are strategic complements, 
meaning that, as one firm increases its price, other firms respond by also raising their prices. 
Correspondingly, a price decrease at one firm will also lead to price decreases at the other 
firms in the industry. We might say that viewer prices move in step. This is a regular feature 
that is found in textbook presentations of price competition. Essentially, a price reduction by 
one firm decreases the marginal profit from a price increase for each of the other firms, so that 
their best responses will be to lower prices.11 
7 
                                                            
11 See, for example, Vives (1999). The term strategic complements and its twin, strategic substitutes, were 
coined by Bulow et al. (1985).  
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However, prices in the advertising market are different, basically because of viewers’ dislike 
of advertising. To see this, suppose that one TV station lowers its price of advertising. This 
will increase the demand for advertising at that TV station, and therefore increase the quantity 
of advertising carried. This in turn makes viewers go elsewhere to TV stations with less 
advertising. With such an inflow of viewers, these other TV stations will observe an increased 
demand from advertisers, to which they will respond by setting higher prices of advertising. 
This means that a lower advertising price at one TV firm leads to higher advertising prices at 
other TV firms. This means that advertising prices are strategic substitutes, or that they move 
out of step.12 
Suppose now that the TV channels’ program contents get more similar, without there being 
any change in the number of firms.13 This causes the competition for viewers to become 
fiercer and, in line with viewer prices moving in step, viewer prices to become lower. 
However, quite the opposite happens in the market for advertising. Now, advertisers are not 
particularly concerned about program content. But they do mind the effect of a TV station 
lowering its viewer price, which creates an inflow of viewers to the TV stations. Therefore, 
since an increase in program contents’ similarity makes a TV station lower its viewer price 
and therefore attract more viewers, the demand from advertisers will increase for that TV 
station. The outcome of all this is that all TV stations set lower viewer prices and higher 
advertising prices as program content becomes more similar. Put differently, advertising’s 
share of TV firms’ total revenues is increasing in content similarity. 
Suppose next that there is an increase in the number of firms without there being any change 
in content similarity.14 As shown by Kind, et al. (2008), an increase in the number of firms 
simply dilutes a firm’s market power in both the viewer market and the advertising market, 
but more so in the advertising market.  Essentially, as long as there is some difference in 
content among TV stations, solely increasing the number of firms cannot take away all of a 
8 
                                                            
12 This distinction between price competition in the viewer market and price competition in the advertising 
market is a quite robust result that also shows up in other models of media competition than the one in Kind, et 
al. (2008) that I focus on here; see, for example, Gabszewicz, et al. (2004). 
13 In terms of the utility function in footnote 10, we analyze the effect of increasing s, keeping m fixed. 
14 This is a bit of a mind stretcher. But think of all TV stations’ program mixes belonging to a big bag, and as a 
new TV station enters, the bag just becomes bigger without seeming any more crowded. In terms of the utility 
function in footnote 10, we now analyze the effect of increasing m, keeping s fixed. 
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firm’s market power in the viewer market, whereas a similar effect is not present in the 
advertising market. The outcome is therefore that advertising’s share of TV firms’ total 
revenues is decreasing in the number of TV firms competing with each other. 
The picture that emerges from this is similar to that of many exercises of economic analysis: 
What is the effect of increased competition on the prevalence of pay TV? – It all depends. If 
increased competition first and foremost means more similar content and not so much an 
increase in the number of firms, then we should expect advertising to be the main source of 
revenue and pay TV to play a minor role, even with technological developments like DTTV. 
However, if increased competition means an increase in the number of firms with a minor 
impact on content similarity, then we can expect pay TV to rise in prominence.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
As my discussion here shows, simple answers on the future of pay TV as digitalization 
continues are not easily available. Should I volunteer an opinion, though, I believe that, in the 
future, we will see an increased role for pay TV as competition increases, implying, with 
reference to the previous section, that I believe the number effect of increased competition to 
be greater than the similarity effect. This is what would happen if, for example, most new TV 
channels entering the industry are niche channels aiming at TV viewers with special program 
interests. But here, as in so many other circumstances, we need to call for the attention of 
further research in order to be able to predict more carefully in which direction the TV 
industry will move. 
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